I. Introduction
Historically, power shifts among nations have been decisive moments in world relations, determining whether war or peace would lead the way. One of the most significant 21st-century power shifts has occurred in the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and China and has created serious questions about whether the power transition can occur peacefully. With the growing economic, military, and technological capabilities of China, the Power Transition Theory (PTT) provides a useful lens through which to study whether the existing international order will be maintained or overturned. Speaking of historical correlations, geopolitical rationale, and policies, this article investigates whether the American-Chinese rivalry is headed for war or if there is still room for peaceful coexistence.
PTT was first developed by A.F.K. Organski in 1958. It is a theory that explains and analyses the dynamics of international relations in terms of the rising conditions for the launch of major conflicts. In simple terms, PTT is based on the premise that the world order is at its weakest and experiences its highest stress when a rising power nearly gains equality with the already established hegemon, more so when the rising power starts to be discontent with the present world order. Such dissatisfaction often springs from a feeling of insult or marginalisation in the existing system, which has given the courage to the rising state to demand major changes or even the total reconstruction for a more favourable order that resonates with its priorities and beliefs.
Among the core aspects of PTT is the emphasis on the satisfaction of the dominant as well as rising powers with the status quo. From the perspective of the theory, when a dominant power is satisfied with the world order, it will attempt to maintain it, fostering stability. On the contrary, a dissatisfied rising power will likely challenge the status quo, increasing the risk of conflict.
Historically, these periods have led to a place where war was likely, for example, tensions before World War I between Britain and Germany, and the superpower Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. Translating into U.S.-China relations, the newly growing competition between the two major powers has significant similarities with earlier transitions, particularly with economic, military, and ideological issues. Zhao Minghao’s evaluation in “Is a New Cold War Inevitable?” states that many Chinese analysts largely agree with the emerging clash moving forward and in compliance with highly intensifying strategic competition caused by the narrowing gap of power between the U.S. and China, coupled with ideological differences and preferences and a competing global-governance vision.
In assessing the trajectory of U.S.-China relations, this article weighs three options: peaceful accommodation, long-term strategic rivalry, and open war. All rest on certain factors and variables like high economic interdependence, military deterrence, and diplomatic negotiation. Implications are massive, not only for the two superpowers but for global stability, systems of government, and the world economy. Two of the greatest geopolitical challenges of this century will be to reflect on whether the U.S.-China power transition will follow the traditional route of violence or follow an alternative route towards coexistence.
II. Understanding Power Transition Theory
Conditions for Peaceful vs. Violent Transitions
Traditionally, power transfers were either bloody or relatively non-violent. Economic interdependence, military capabilities, and diplomatic connections were some of the key variables involved. Power transfer between Great Britain and the United States in the early part of the twentieth century has also been seen as largely peaceful due to the two countries having highly similar power and economic interests. In contrast, Germany’s growing strength prior to World War I, which came to be dissatisfied with the then-prevailing British-dominated world order, gave rise to brutal warfare.
Chinese analysts, as talked about in Zhao’s “Is a New Cold War Inevitable?”, contend that U.S.-China relations show various factors that might cause conflict, such as ideological difference and a fight for regional dominance. Yet, others, like Mearsheimer, argue that China has also shown a desire to act in established constructs, having a hybrid strategy that might facilitate a steadier transition.
China has an ambiguous position: while able to profit from existing global institutions such as the WTO, it equally promotes new institutions like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as expressions of its discontent with Western-led financial systems. Continuing to view the matter through the lens of competition rather than accommodation, the National Security Strategy designates China as a revisionist power, a state that favours modifications to the prevailing order. Thus, this very approach risks intensifying China’s perception that the prevailing order is designed to contain its rise, and thereby heighten the chances for confrontation rather than cooperation.
Economic interdependence has historically acted as a stabilising factor in periods of great power transition. The large volume of trade between the U.S. and China, despite some tensions, means that each country has major reasons to steer clear of all-out war. The shift toward economic decoupling and competition in advanced technologies, notably in AI and semiconductors, can undermine this stabilizing force.
Military power is the other important element. China’s ongoing expansion of its naval power and military presence in the South China Sea has been driving security tensions in the Indo-Pacific, with a U.S. countermove in the shape of stronger alliances such as AUKUS and the Quad. The issue of Taiwan remains the strongest dispute, with increasing military presence and activity on both sides.
Diplomatic engagement provides another area of transition management. Experience in the past suggests the likelihood that continuous dialogue and interaction, the establishment of trust, and institution-based collaboration will reduce the danger of conflict. Some analysts argue that America and China would have to embrace a competitive coexistence where there would be a competitive strategy, but one that is in a secure environment. This implies that both nations would have to establish tangible red lines as well as avenues for de-escalation, such as the Cold War arms control agreements.
Meanwhile, the power transition theory assumes conflict is inevitable when an upstart power moves towards equality with an existing hegemon, and the result is not predetermined. Whether or not this transfer of the baton from America to China will happen peacefully or violently will depend in great part on how these two nations deal with economic interdependence, military policy, and diplomacy over the coming decades.
III. Historical Parallels & Lessons
Britain vs. Germany (19th-20th Century)
Perhaps the most famous failed power-transition case was the competition between Britain and Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Germany, fast industrialising, technologically advancing, and gaining economic strength, was an emerging challenger to Britain’s world leadership. Yet Germany was not content with the British-dominated global order; it wanted a larger say in matters of world importance. This dissatisfaction, combined with nationalistic aspirations and military advancements, put immense strains on what was then a fragile world order, leading to the First World War. After that came the unresolved conflicts of that war, coupled with economic instability and authoritarianism, paving the way for World War II. The exclusion of Germany from the power transition of the present world order establishes how horrible wars can stem from failed power-transition cases in which the ascendant power forms no part of meaningful global decision-making. What were the results of that? Two world wars.
Cold War: U.S. vs. Soviet Union
Compared to the case of Britain and Germany, direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War did not occur mainly due to the fact of nuclear deterrence. The United States and the USSR were representative of antithetical political and economic doctrines, liberal democracy and capitalism versus authoritarian communism, and made power transfer very difficult in a peaceful manner. Instead of an immediate war, the competition was established through arms races, proxy wars, and economic rivalry. The final economic inefficiencies and inability to keep pace with the U.S.-dominated international economy resulted in the Soviet collapse in 1991. The instance demonstrates the operation of ideological conflict in building the power shifts and the prominence of economic power in the capacity to sustain great power competition. Additionally, the mutual assured destruction capability offered by nuclear weapons compelled the superpowers to contain their rivalry by diplomacy and deterrence instead of open war.
Japan’s Rise & U.S. Accommodation (20th Century)
An extraordinary case of a peaceful transfer of power can be cited in Japan’s post-Second World War development. Unlike Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan put greater stress on economic growth than on military expansion and thus emerged as a major partner in the US-led global system. By the time it avoided open confrontation with the US in favour of economic integration, trade liberalisation, and strategic collaboration, Japan had become the second-largest economy in the world. The US facilitated this transformation, welcomed Japan into the world economic system, secured its defence through military alliances, and fostered its economic development, not considering it a geopolitical threat. This case shows that transitions in power can be peaceful as long as the rising power cooperates with the world order and is accommodated rather than excluded.
IV. U.S.-China Rivalry Through the Lens of PTT
Economic Dimensions
China’s economic emergence has reshaped the world economic order and disrupted US economic supremacy. China became a global challenger based on government-sponsored initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and advances in artificial intelligence, clean energy, and semiconductor production. The emergence marks a shift away from the post-World War II liberal economic order established by the United States. The Trump trade war and recent economic decoupling initiatives of the Trump administration are symptoms of an even broader quest for financial hegemony. As David Shambaugh maps out in his article “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia”, this fight is not just about bilateral rivalry; it’s also about global supply chains, financial institutions, and regional free trade agreements.
In Christopher Layne’s argument, the wider consequences of this alteration are laid bare as he contends that the changing economic centre of gravity of China challenges the U.S.-dominated global order. As China sets up opposing financial institutions like the AIIB, a major question arises: Will this foster an international order on Chinese terms, undermining U.S. economic hegemony? Moving forward, as China encourages self-sufficiency in key areas of semiconductor fabrication, 5G technology, and artificial intelligence, this further accelerates U.S. attempts at keeping China from accessing breakthrough technologies. What resulted was the fracturing of global supply chains, where two different competing technology ecosystems arose, those being the U.S. and China, thus intensifying the conflict.
Beijing’s provision of financing alternative sources for developing nations also speaks to China’s economic muscle. Having started with the BRI, Beijing has extended huge loans to almost all nations across Asia, Africa, and Latin America instead of some facilities to strategic harbours and precious resources, and thereby propagated the idea of debt diplomacy. Washington doesn’t like it when China puts this tactic into practice, thinking that Beijing’s growing supremacy could be utilised against undermining US geopolitics as well as strategic economic interests. Thus, the U.S. is countering China’s economic growth with initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and infrastructure development in areas of strategic interest to the U.S.
Military Balance
Military considerations also add to the competition between the U.S. and China. The military modernisation of China, particularly in naval forces and missile systems, is shifting the strategic balance of the Indo-Pacific. Barber identifies that great power changes are often characterised by shifts in military power, validating the argument that China’s rise to power is a strong force for its challenge of U.S. hegemony.
American policymakers, according to De Graaff & Van Apeldoorn (2018), view China as a revisionist nation seeking to reshape regional security. This has created increased U.S. military engagement, including the establishment of the AUKUS alliance, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States intended to “promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, and deepening the Quad, a grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, which attempt to counterbalance Chinese reach. The most contentious flashpoint remains Taiwan, where Beijing is determined to reunify and Washington employs uncertainty. As tensions escalate, both sides risk an unintended conflict.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invested heavily in A2/AD systems, hypersonic missile systems, and cyber facilities. The PLA Navy also has China’s largest navy following unprecedented buys of aircraft carriers, submarines, and assault amphibious ships. China’s naval buildup will allow it to project power into the South China Sea, where it has artificially extended and modernised military bases to increase its reach. This has motivated the United States to build a larger military presence in the area with Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), increased combined drills with allies, and installing newer missile defence shields. The American approach is expanding into dealing with Chinese quantity superiority through added dispersed lethality and UAV-related technologies. Washington also expanded defence relations with other nations, mainly India, the Philippines, and Japan, in order to offer an effective deterrence net.
Despite these tensions, nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence are stabilising elements. As “The U.S.-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana” reports, those elements may inhibit all-out war, but not necessarily lower the prospect of heightened military competition. Diplomatic manoeuvring and crisis management protocols will be instrumental in avoiding the escalation of tension.
Diplomatic & Ideological Factors
China’s climb has also been a diplomatic and ideological challenge to the international order led by the US. Organisations like BRI and AIIB provide alternatives to Western-controlled financial systems, and debates within the WTO are wider manifestations of disagreement over global governance. Mearsheimer discusses how this fight has transcended economic and military competition into a battle for influence through diplomacy and culture.
The ideological divide between China and the U.S. also adds to the tensions. America advocates a liberal democratic model while China advocates a state-capitalist model associated with authoritarianism. Thus, it becomes a conflict of governance systems that shapes international alignments with few states leaning toward China’s developmental agenda as opposed to that of liberal democracy advanced by the U.S. Barber states that hegemonic states have to keep pace with the alterations in the global political order; otherwise, they will lose their hegemony. The issue at hand is whether the United States will indeed be able to satisfactorily address such an ideological challenge without losing its leading position.
V. Key Flashpoints & Potential Scenarios
Areas of Tension
- Taiwan’s security
The ambition of unification with Taiwan is one of China’s core national priorities, while the U.S. remains dedicated to Taiwan’s security by means of deterrence, arms sales and diplomatic pressure.
- South China Sea territorial disputes
Territorial claim disputes and militarisation of the region have heightened tensions, with China asserting control over vital waterways and the U.S. conducting FONOPs to challenge that control.
- Technology
The rivalry for technological dominance, including semiconductor production and AI, has increased. Cybersecurity threats and espionage increase tensions, resulting in tighter controls on technology transfer and collaboration.
Scenarios for the Future
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Peaceful Accommodation
An ordered transition in which the U.S. allows China greater global leadership in return for stability within the system. This would include greater diplomatic engagement, trade treaties, and measures to de-escalate military tension. There would still be competition, but mutual cooperation on challenges like trade, global health, and regulation of the global economy could mean a more stable world order.
Barber is convinced that hegemonic transformation can be non-violent if the rising powers are integrated into the existing system through multilateral institutions and economic interdependence. The U.S. can utilise its might to establish global norms but contain direct confrontation, achieving long-term stability without blank surrender.
A prime illustration of this approach in practice can be seen with the Phase One trade agreement reached between China and the U.S. in 2020, which aimed to stabilise economic relations through disciplined bargaining rather than frontal confrontation.
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Protracted Competition
A prolonged Cold War-style rivalry where economic, military, and diplomatic rivalry persist without explicit military war. Here, constant power balancing in the form of alliances, economic decoupling, and technology competition exists, but devices like crisis management hotlines and regional agreements prevent the spillover to open war.
Layne suggests that American decline will not directly result in war if competition is managed effectively. By the exercise of alliances and economic interdependence, the U.S. may maintain influence without suffering the disastrous costs of direct war.
One such recent example is the current US effort to tighten alliances in the Indo-Pacific theatre, e.g., expanding the Quad mission for regional security without necessarily involving military force to take on China outright.
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Conflict & War
A worst-case miscalculation leading to military conflict, and most probably over Taiwan or the South China Sea. With international economic interdependence and nuclear deterrence, such an event is still very undesirable but avoidable by strong diplomacy and strategic restraint.
Huang, Lien & Xiang are keen to point out that hard power confrontations are most times precipitated by misperceptions and immediate escalation. The U.S. and China need to establish credible diplomatic channels in order to reduce tensions and prevent conflicts from getting out of hand.
One recent instance of rising tensions includes the heightened Chinese military activity surrounding Taiwan following the visit of Speaker Pelosi in 2022, with air intrusions into Taiwan’s air defence space, prompting the U.S. military presence in the region to deter aggression.
VI. Conclusion
The path of the U.S.-China power transition is not clear, with previous patterns offering hope for peaceful accommodation as well as the threat of war. Whereas some power transitions, such as Britain’s accommodation of the United States, have been tranquil, others, such as the Germany-Britain competition, have led to war. It shall be emphasised that deterrence and diplomacy are quite interdependent, highlighting a rich history of both encouragement and caution. Today, nuclear deterrence exists as a stabiliser primarily on the effectiveness of strategic communication and the absence of miscalculation.
The current geopolitical landscape, with its nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, suggests that total war is unlikely, but tensions will persist. However, miscalculations could still lead to dangerous escalations, for example, South China Sea miscalculations, tension concerning Taiwan, or technology disputes, among other things. Both countries must institutionalise crisis-management mechanisms to ensure that rivalry doesn’t evolve into confrontation.
For that purpose, to become effective, diplomacy must prevail. Confidence and security-building steps, arms-control agreements, and crisis communications bridges can reduce the likelihood of mistakes. Economic integration through bargained trade agreements and synchronised supply-chain strategies can preclude excessive decoupling and damage to global markets. Deterrence using the military is still necessary, but must be paralleled by initiatives to prevent accidents.
Beyond the U.S. and China, other actors such as Japan, India, the European Union, and international institutions like the UN and WTO have diplomatic interventions to present. A balanced multilateral approach thus steers the competition into beneficial paths rather than destructive ones.
The stakes in this competition are greater than those of the U.S. and China. International trade, technological leadership, and global order for the future depend on how the two powers play their competition out. The world must encourage China to be engaged in multilateral systems that invite China into existing institutions without upsetting the norms of a stable,e rules-based order. Ultimately, peaceful competition and strategic coexistence are still the optimal path forward to an increasingly multipolar world.
VII. References
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Mearsheimer, J. J. (2023). The inevitable rivalry: America, China, and the tragedy of Great-Power politics. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war
Rauch, Carsten (2016). “Adjusting Power Transition Theory – Satisfaction with the Status Quo, International Power Constellations, and the Case of the Weimar Republic.” Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, vol. 2, pp. 127–158.https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=425726
Ritschl, A. (1998). How and when did Germany catch up to Great Britain and the US? Humboldt University of Berlin. https://personal.lse.ac.uk/ritschl/pdf_files/KETCHUP.pdf
Shambaugh, D. (2018). U.S.-China rivalry in Southeast Asia. In Amitav Acharya, Paul Evans, Joseph Chinyong Liow, Phillip Saunders, Robert Sutter, Michael Yahuda, Kwa Chong Guan, Friedrich Wu, Sigur Centre of Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, & U.S. Department of State, International Security (pp. 85–127). President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00314
Zhao, M. (2019). Is a new Cold War inevitable? Chinese perspectives on US–China strategic competition. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 12(3), 371–394. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poz010